

Assertability Differences between Epistemic Adverbs and Adjectives

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Epistemic Adjectives vs. Epistemic Adverbs

- ▶ Two types of epistemic operators discussed here
 - E-adjjectives: *It is certain/probable/possible that this rock is a meteorite.*
 - E-adverbs: *This rock is certainly/probably/possibly a meteorite.*
- ▶ Differences between E-adjjectives and E-adverbs, for *certain(ly)*
 - Under negation (Bellert 1977, Papafragou 2016, Wolf 2015)
 - *It is not certain / uncertain that this rock is meteorite.*
 - *This rock is *not certainly / uncertainly a meteorite.*
 - Divergence of operators (Nilsen 2004, Wolf et al. 2016)
 - *It is possible that Le Pen will win, even though she certainly will lose.*
 - *#Le Pen will possibly win, even though she certainly / it is certain that she will lose.*


Subjective vs. objective E-operators

- ▶ E-adverbs are subjective, E-adjectives are objective epistemic operators (cf. Hengeveld 1988, Nuyts 2001)
 - *certainly* ϕ : S expresses a subjective estimation that ϕ is highly likely.
 - *certain* ϕ : S states that there is a high likelihood that ϕ (by a relevant epistemic source)
- ▶ Consequences for assertability of clauses with E-operators (Lassiter 2016)
 - “a privately held certainty, or denial of possibility, may be felt to be less subject to public scrutiny and approbation if it turns out to be incorrect”
 - “less subject to public scrutiny” = easier to defend = more assertable

Scenario

Lottery with 1000 tickets, 1 winning ticket, Bill bought 1 ticket.

- ▶ *It is certain that Bill did not win the raffle./ Bill certainly did not win the raffle.*
- ▶ *It is possible that Bill won the raffle./ Bill possibly won the raffle.*



His experiment shows :

- *certain not ϕ < certainly not ϕ*
- *possibly ϕ < possible ϕ*

$\alpha < \beta$: participants assented less often to α than to β , i.e.:
 α is “less assertable” than β

Theoretical explanation

- Lassiter: *certainly* ϕ less subject to scrutiny = easier to assert than *certain* ϕ .
- Why not also: *possibly* ϕ less subject to scrutiny, hence easier to assert, than *possible* ϕ ?
- This would lead to the opposite of what Lassiter actually found.
- Our take: With *possibly* ϕ speaker wants to put ϕ as an option to consider into the Common Ground, not necessarily with *possible* ϕ
- Hence *# Le Pen will possibly win, even though she certainly / it is certain that she will lose.* is pragmatically infelicitous: It introduces ϕ as an option and then rules out that ϕ obtains.
- *possibly* ϕ has an additional pragmatic purpose over *possible* ϕ , hence less assertable

Methodological choices

- Test for *certain(ly)* involves negation, which may affect results.
- Lottery scenario invites frequentist view of probability, this may favor assertability of objective E-operators (adjectives).

Our goals with experiments

Our experiments extend Lassiter's study in two ways:

- ▶ Compare judgements on assertability in objective/measurable and subjective/non-measurable contexts.
- ▶ Compare judgments on assertability on propositions with and without negation.

- ▶ Experiment 1:
 - measurable vs. non-measurable contexts
 - probabilities used for measurable contexts: 10% & 95%
- ▶ Experiment 2:
 - the effect of polarity: positive vs. negative
 - the effect of extremeness of probability: probabilities used for measurable contexts: 0.1% vs. 10%, 99.9% vs. 95%
- ▶ One context, one test sentence per participant
- ▶ Amazon MechanicalTurk platform

Measurable probabilities (numerical evidence)

The elementary school held a raffle to raise money for student activities. A total of 1000 tickets were sold. Of those, . . .

10% probability continuation

100 tickets were purchased by Jay, a wealthy local business person. 900 tickets were purchased by other members of the community.

Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statement.

Jay possibly won the raffle. Agree Disagree

(1) Participants read one of the two sentences:

- a. It is possible that Jay won the raffle.
- b. Jay possibly won the raffle.

Non-measurable probabilities (non-numerical evidence)

A murder took place on a yacht in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. The victim was stabbed. The police concluded that the murderer must have been one of the passengers on the yacht. Jay is one of the passengers. The amount of information the police has gotten so far is as follows:

- Jay was seen having a friendly conversation with the victim on the yacht shortly before the murder.
- The murder was most likely committed by a left-hander. Jay is right-handed.
- The murder weapon was found in the cabin of another passenger, not Jays.
- Finger prints from several passengers, including Jay, were found at the crime scene.
- Jay does not stand to benefit from the victim's death.

(2) a. It is possible that Jay committed the murder.
b. Jay possibly committed the murder.

- ▶ Low probabilities:
 - **possibly** leads to fewer **agree** responses than **possible**.
 - The acceptability difference is greater in the non-measurable condition than in the measurable condition.
- ▶ High probabilities:
 - **certainly** leads to more **agree** responses than **certain**.
 - The acceptability difference is greater in the non-measurable than measurable condition.

(3) a. H1a: possible ϕ > possibly ϕ
b. H1b: certain ϕ < certainly ϕ

(4) H2: DIFF(adverb, adjective)_{NONMEAS} > DIFF(adverb, adjective)_{MEAS}



Experimental conditions (Experiment 1)

operators	probability	measurability
certain/certainly	95%	measurable
certain/certainly	(~95%)	non-measurable
possible/possibly	10%	measurable
possible/possibly	(~10%)	non-measurable

Note

- For Experiment 1, we needed the perceived likelihood for the non-measurable contexts to be closely matched to the numerical probability of the measurable contexts.
- We conducted a **norming study** for the non-measurable contexts, and used the data to determine the probabilities of the measurable contexts.

Results: experiment 1



certain < certainly (95%)

- ▶ Hypothesis H1a is not supported in **non-measurable** ($p=0.9$) condition.
- ▶ The difference is significant in **measurable** condition ($p<.01$), but in the opposite direction from predicted.

possible > possibly (10%)

- ▶ Hypothesis H1b isn't supported in **measurable** ($p=.276$) but is in **non-measurable** condition ($p<.01$).
- ▶ H2: numerically supported, but not significant ($p=.222026$).

Questions:

- ▶ Why was H1b **possible** $\phi > \text{possibly } \phi$ not supported in the measurable condition (contra Lassiter's study)?
- ▶ Why was H1a **certain** $\phi < \text{certainly } \phi$ not supported in either the measurable or non-measurable conditions?

For experiment 2, we made changes to Experiment 1:

- ▶ Focus on mathematically measurable condition
- ▶ Test sentences with and without negation
- ▶ Probabilities moderate (95%/10%) vs. extreme (99.9%/0.1%)


Experimental conditions: experiment 2

operators	probability	polarity	
certain/certainly	95%	positive	from Experiment 1
certain/certainly	95%	negative	
certain/certainly	99.9%	positive	
certain/certainly	99.9%	negative	Lassiter replication
possible/possibly	10%	positive	from Experiment 1
possible/possibly	10%	negative	
possible/possibly	0.1%	positive	Lassiter replication

Experiment 2: certain < certainly without negation

Conditions:

- ▶ 95% positive (Experiment 1)
- ▶ 99.9% positive




H1a: certain < certainly

- ▶ Operator type is a significant effect: At 99.9%, hypothesis is supported without negation ($p < .05$)
- ▶ Model: Imer with operator type and extremeness of probabilities as fixed effects
- ▶ Operator type is a significant effect ($p < .01$).
- ▶ Extremeness of the probability, too ($p < .01$).

Experiment 2: certain not < certainly not

Conditions:


- ▶ 95% negative
- ▶ 99.9% negative (Lassiter replication)



H1a: certain not < certainly not

- ▶ Model: Imer with operator type and extremeness of probabilities as fixed effects
- ▶ Operator type is a significant effect ($p < .01$).
- ▶ Extremeness of the probability is not ($p = .627$).


Experiment 2: possible > possibly (0.1% vs. 10%)



H1b: possible > possibly (0.1%)

- ▶ With more extreme probability, the difference in the proportion of agree responses between **possible** and **possibly** became significant ($p < .01$).
- ▶ Model: Imer with operator type and extremeness as fixed effects
- ▶ Operator type ($p < .01$)
- ▶ Extremeness of the probabilities ($p = 0.18386$).
- ▶ No interaction ($p = 0.18386$)

Experiment 2: possible (not) > possibly (not) at 10%



H1b: possible > possibly (10%)

- ▶ With negation, the difference in the proportion of agree responses between **possible** and **possibly** became significant ($p < .01$).
- ▶ Model: Imer with operator type and polarity as fixed effects
- ▶ Operator type ($p < .01$)
- ▶ Polarity ($p = 0.8043$).
- ▶ No interaction ($p = 0.2067$)

Summary of Experiment 2

- ▶ Overall, the polarity had an effect on the proportion of agree responses for **certain/certainly**.
- ▶ Except for the results from the 95% probability with the E-adjective **certain** without negation, the extremeness of the probability did not seem to have an effect on the proportion of agree responses.

- ▶ Good evidence that E-adverbs and E-adjectives are used in distinct ways.
- ▶ Surprising effect of the level of probability on **certain**
- ▶ Surprising influence of negation

Why? – possible explanations:

- ▶ levels of probability: possibly related to the granularity level of the two probabilities used. 95% is rounder than 99.9%, and as a result, it may be that objective E-operator is used in a more approximate way.
- ▶ negation: unusual nature of the scenario, as a person buys most tickets.

Appendix

*“Participants would be less strict in their use of subjective **possibly** and **certainly**, on the ground that a **privately held certainty, or denial of possibility**, may be felt to be less subject to public scrutiny and approbation if it turns out to be correct.”*

- ▶ Reading *privately held certainty or denial of possibility* as two separate cases: presupposes that with *possib(l)y* S always denies what an opponent has said, this is unjustified.
- ▶ Reading *denial of possibility* as elaboration of *certainty*, and recalling that Lassiter uses negation:

(1) <i>certainly</i> $\neg \phi$	less subject to public scrutiny than	<i>certain</i> $\neg \phi$	
(2) \neg <i>possibly</i> ϕ	less subject to public scrutiny than	\neg <i>possible</i> ϕ	by modal laws
(3) <i>possibly</i> ϕ	more subject to public scrutiny than	<i>possible</i> ϕ	by logic of less/more

But why should providing a **subjective** possibility be **more** subject to public scrutiny than an objective possibility?

There must be something flawed in the argument, e.g., (2) *possibly* ϕ cannot be in the scope of negation.

E-adverbs do not belong to the asserted content, but specify the nature of the assertion itself.

- ▶ *possibly* ϕ is subjective, hence, easier to defend than *possible* ϕ , but
- ▶ with *possibly* ϕ , S considers the evidence sufficient that ϕ should be considered,
- ▶ this is not the case with *it is possible that* ϕ , where S asserts a possibility of ϕ
- ▶ hence *possibly* ϕ is usable in fewer circumstances
- ▶ *I consider it possible that* ϕ may be more assertable than *it is possible that* ϕ

(5)

- a. Participants were first told that they would read a short text and answer some questions about it.
- b. They then read the context story.
- c. After the context story was provided, one of the test sentences was presented below the context story.
- d. Participants were asked whether they agree or disagree with the statement by clicking on a button for Agree or Disagree, placed side-by-side, while the context story and the prompt for a response was still visible. After the response, the page cleared.
- e. Comprehension questions and demographic questions were then asked.

Only one of the test sentences was presented to each participant. There were three comprehension questions that each participant was required to respond to check their attention.

Participants: Experiment 1

- ▶ 200 participants were recruited for each list at Amazon MechanicalTurk.
- ▶ Different number of participants were taken out of the data from each list because of the responses to the comprehension questions.

	measurable			
operator	possible	possibly	certain	certainly
N	140	150	107	118

	non-measurable			
operator	possible	possibly	certain	certainly
N	187	115	155	154

Experiment 1: results (high probability contexts)

Measurability	Measurable		Non-measurable	
Operator	certain	certainly	certain	certainly
<i>N</i> of Participants	107	118	155	154
<i>N</i> of agree responses	95	85	128	128
% of agree	88.8	72.0	82.6	83.1
upper confidence interval	94.8	80.1	88.6	89.0
lower confidence interval	82.8	63.9	76.6	77.2

certain ϕ < certainly ϕ

- ▶ the acceptability difference between **certain** and **certainly** is greater in the non-measurable condition

Experiment 1: results (low probability contexts)

Measurability	measurable		non-measurable	
operator	possible	possibly	possible	possibly
N of Participants	140	150	187	115
N of agree responses	123	125	114	44
% of agree	87.9	83.3	61.0	38.3
upper confidence interval	93.3	89.3	68.0	47.1
lower confidence interval	82.4	77.4	54.0	29.4

possible $\phi >$ possibly ϕ

- ▶ the acceptability difference between possible and possibly is greater in the non-measurable condition

Participants: Experiment 2

	probability	99.9%	95%
operator	certain not	125	100
	certainly not	131	91
	certain	99	
	certainly	149	

	probability	10%	0.1%
operator	possible not	98	
	possibly not	110	
	possible		147
	possibly		109

Experiment 2: with vs. without negation (at 99.9%)

Operator	certain not	certainly not	certain	certainly
N of participants	125	131	99	149
N of agree responses	34	73	65	116
% of agree	27.2	55.7	65.7	77.9
upper confidence interval	35.0	64.2	75.0	84.5
lower confidence interval	19.4	47.2	56.3	71.2

certain ϕ > certainly ϕ

► with or without negation, we obtained the pattern (p-value)

Experiment 2: certain(ly) not at 99.9% vs. 95%

Operator	99.9%		95%	
	% certain neg	% certainly neg	% certain neg	% certainly neg
N of participants	125	131	100	91
N of agree responses	34	73	27	46
% of agree	27.2	55.7	27.0	50.5
upper ci	35.0	64.2	35.7	60.8
lower ci	19.4	47.2	18.3	40.3

certain ϕ > certainly ϕ

► with negation, we obtained the pattern at both probabilities (p-value)

Experiment 2: with vs. without negation (at 10%)

negation	with negation		without negation	
Operator	possible	not	possibly	not
N of participants	98	110	140	150
N of agree	85	77	123	125
% of agree	86.7	70.0	87.9	83.3
upper confidence interval	93.5	78.6	93.3	89.3
lower confidence interval	80.0	61.4	82.4	77.4

possible ϕ > possibly ϕ

- ▶ with negation, the difference between **possible** and **possibly** became significant (p-value)

Experiment 2: possib(ly) at 0.1% vs. 10%

probability	0.1%		10%	
Operator	possible	possibly	possible	possibly
N of participants	147	109	140	150
N of agree	128	77	123	125
% of agree	87.1	70.6	87.9	83.3
upper confidence interval	92.5	79.2	93.3	89.3
lower confidence interval	81.7	62.1	82.4	77.4

possible ϕ > possibly ϕ

- at 0.1%, the difference between possible and possibly became significant (p-value)